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## **Historical Political Economy of Higher Education in Kyrgyzstan**

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I am very grateful for this opportunity to share some ideas. This conference is held in extraordinary times: we are in the middle of a pandemic and unprecedented political turmoil and economic strain. There is a ray of hope in these times of distemper. The country has the largest mass of university-educated people in its history. Such human capital, when mobilized, results in better social, economic and governance outcomes. LiK is an initiative that keeps the embers warm.

Alas – I will not be showing slides – the lecture will be delivered the old-fashioned way – talking and hope you can bear with me.

This talk covers four themes:

- i) the social structures and social inequalities that emerged in the Tsarist and Soviet periods that impacted post-secondary education, and I will spend some time on this because I have found that this tends to be unfamiliar territory;
- ii) changes in the economic and social order that reshaped higher education after Independence;
- iii) the role that higher education plays, and fails to play, in meeting development needs today and;
- iv) prospects for reform.

During the talk, I will bombard you with numbers – I apologize in advance.

I)

Kyrgyzstan became an ‘internal colony’ in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and remained one until the Soviet Union collapsed. An ‘internal colony’ is characterized by highly centralized control by the core – Russia – and a social structure marked by a deep a 'cultural division of labour' where dominant roles are reserved for members of the core and the periphery population relegated to lower-level positions. The needs of the centre drive the colony's development. Although overall development occurs, cultural-national stratification persists. And inevitably, the disadvantaged group will reactively assert itself. In this context, higher education is a terrain of contestation as the Kyrgyz, like many other titular nations of the Union republics, pressured for access to universities and post-secondary institutions to open avenues of social and occupational mobility. This is the overall framework of this lecture.

Let's begin with the historical legacy. In the wake of Imperial Russia's conquest of Central Asia, Kyrgyz lands became part of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship with its capital in Tashkent. Like other Central Asian nationalities, the Kyrgyz were given the status of 'aliens' (*inorodtsy*). In light of the 1897 all-Imperial census, 90% of the 8 million people living in Turkestan were aliens.

Russian colonial expansion was through the acquisition of contiguous territories, not overseas colonies. And these lands were to be absorbed into an Imperial state that had a chauvinist mentality. In the ideological construct of the Imperial State there was virtually no room for the rights of minorities. Neither was there much of an attempt to forge a supra-state identity - an all-Imperial identity - such as 'the Soviet People' that happened under the USSR. The 1911 circular of the Governor-General of Turkestan is a good example of Imperial thinking at that time. It stated: "We do not live in Asia... but in a Russian region... We need to insert the spirit of great respect for everything Russian. Those who do not obey will suffer a terrible fate."

For Russia to secure lands obtained through military conquest - it had to colonize them. Thus, trailing military occupation, there occurred a massive wave of Russian colonization. Colonization was also pushed by the Tsarist regime because it helped address the critical agrarian problem in European Russia that followed the Emancipation of serfs in 1861. It freed the peasantry but neglected to provide them with land to eke out a living because of the landed nobility's opposition.

In any case, Kyrgyzstan's colonization was on a large scale, and the land was simply confiscated from the local population. By 1912, 87,000 colonists to whom arms were distributed; and they held 4.6 million hectares of arable AND pasture lands. This left the 780,000 Kyrgyz, 3.7 million hectares - one million less than what the colonists had. It was a brutal, rapacious land grab. The Kyrgyz were driven out of the Chui valley and other fertile areas and chased to the hilltops and brushlands, and a large number became penurious day labourers. It was against this backdrop of social tensions that the tragedy of the October 1916 uprising unfolded.

That uprising occurred because the Tsarist regime was facing mounting losses during the First World War. In July 1916, at the height of the agricultural season, it ordered the conscription of Central Asian 'natives' to serve as auxiliaries. (Hitherto, they had been exempted from conscription because of their status as 'aliens'.) Embittered by land seizures, this latest step by Imperial authorities sparked a large-scale revolt. The uprisings were put down with considerable brutality.

It is estimated that more than 100,000 Kyrgyz died during the suppression of the uprising, and some 100,000-120,000 made the arduous journey through mountain passes to seek refuge in China, and many died along the way. It is estimated that in 1916 the Kyrgyz lost around one-third of their population. The 1916 tragedy, a taboo topic during the Soviet period, was publicly discussed only after independence.

Let me turn briefly to education. In 1868, the Tsarist Foreign Minister said the conquest of Central Asia aimed to advance "the progress of civilization," and virtually nothing was done. In 1897 the educational system serving 8 million people in five oblasts employed 3,766 people, among them nine women.

\* By 1914, there were 107 Russian primary schools in Kyrgyzstan, with over 7,000 male students, 500 Kyrgyz.

\* In 1914, the first girl's school opened with 42 pupils - no Kyrgyz.

\* There were ten primary schools for Kyrgyz ('schools for natives' – *tuzemtsy*) - 300 boys.

\* In 1910, a gymnasium offering academic secondary education opened in Bishkek. It had one Kyrgyz graduate. There were no post-secondary institutions.

But a small Kyrgyz educated class did appear because of civil society's efforts, as we would call it now, and they were to play an essential role in advancing national interests when the Soviets came to power. Their emergence was made possible by two factors. The first is that the Tsarist regime, while autocratic, was not totalitarian. It left space for some civil society activity. The second, absorption into the Empire, exposed many Kyrgyz, especially students, to the influence of the Jadist movement spearheaded by the Tatars that sought to modernize the Muslim population of the Empire, especially by advancing education and the emancipation of women. Many Kyrgyz students travelled to Kazan, Ufa and Orenburg, important educational and cultural centres. In Kyrgyzstan, scores of Jadist 'new method' schools were opened by benefactors and communities. Newspapers and books circulated even to remote areas. In 1909 in At-Bashy village, 360 kilometres from Bishkek, someone had a subscription to Vakyt, an Orenburg newspaper well-known for its progressive views.

Then came the October 1917 revolution in Russia, and by early 1918 the Bolsheviks established control over Kyrgyzstan. Political groups advocating an autonomous republic were dissolved. As for the administration, basically, everything remained the same as in the Tsarist period. In the words of one eyewitness, "Virtually the entire administration was made up of Russians."

Faced with persistent unrest, it was clear that some accommodation with the Kyrgyz was required. The Soviets brought the small Kyrgyz intelligentsia into administration, and they created a lobby advancing national interests, starting with territorial identity.

In 1926 the Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was established as part of the Russian SSR, a wily move by the Kyrgyz communists since the alternative was absorption by Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan. The capital formerly called Pyshpek was renamed Frunze, which the Kyrgyz pronounced as 'Poronze' because their language has no letter 'F' nor clusters of consonants. The Kyrgyz ASSR created symbols of cultural and political identity that fostered nation-building. In 1936 Kyrgyzstan became a Union Republic.

The Soviets who came to power with a promise of rapid modernization inherited a formidable legacy of under-development and a society marked by a deep cultural-national division of labour.

Kyrgyzstan's development had two distinctive periods: before and after the Second World War.

The pre-War years saw collectivization and industrialization. Collectivization was not as brutal and devastating of rural societies as in Kazakhstan or Ukraine. The Kyrgyz were saved by geography: the mountainous lands "could only be profitable if utilized in a pastoral way". Traditional kinship- oriented society and even a significant proportion of *manaps* (hereditary clan) leadership remained substantially intact, and quite some manaps became heads of collective farms.

A campaign against illiteracy was rigorously pursued and was greeted with enthusiasm: by 1939, 73% Kyrgyz women and 84% of men under 50 were literate according to the census. These numbers are undoubtedly inflated. However, whatever the literacy rates, they would have been higher if it was not for two changes in the alphabet. Until 1928 the Persian-Arabic alphabet was used; in 1928, the Latin script was introduced and replaced by the Cyrillic alphabet in 1940.

Pre-war Soviet rule was also accompanied by the arrival of a significant number of cadres from European Russia. It was of such a scale that the Kyrgyz share of the population dropped from 67% in 1926 to 51% in 1939. No attention was paid to spatial economic development – the overall urbanization rate in 1939 was 22%, only 3% higher than in 1926. Growth was concentrated on Bishkek, whose population tripled and reached 93,000 by 1939. But this growth by-passed the Kyrgyz, who represented a mere 6% of their republic's capital. In fact, in 1939, the Kyrgyz had the most deformed social structure among the USSR's 15 titular nations: 84% were collective farmers, 7.5% workers, and 4.6% employees.

Simultaneously, Stalin's purges had a devastating effect, killing or incarcerating some 30,000 people – this is an enormous huge proportion of the educated classes - eliminating the first generation of the organizing core of Kyrgyz society, especially its political, intellectual and cultural elites. This is an enormous number given the nation's population size and social structure.

The second wave of the modernization of Kyrgyzstan was a result of the Second World War. Drawing on the lessons of the Second World War, when the Germans over-ran or destroyed industry concentrated in the European USSR, Soviet leaders implemented an industrial locations policy that, for strategic reasons, dispersed capacity deeper into the hinterland which, aircraft based in Europe could not reach. These enterprises were placed under central, all-Union

jurisdiction. Their outputs served value chains of the broader USSR. Between 1940 and 1980, in Kyrgyzstan, the volume of industrial production increased by an impressive 38 times. But the value of agricultural output, for example, grew only four times.

Development was concentrated in urban centres, namely Bishkek and its surroundings, where 80 gigantic enterprises were built employing thousands. The urban population saw a fourfold increase. The country's infrastructure improved significantly.

This wave of modernization did not result in any significant changes in national-cultural stratification. Classical urban migration theory would expect rural-urban migration to occur at an accelerated rate given development conditions. It did not happen. Soviet and most Western scholars attribute this to cultural factors such as rural conservatism, patriarchal societies—nothing of the sort.

Geographical mobility was hampered because, until 1974, collective farmers were not given an internal passport and were prohibited from leaving their villages. In 1959, 70% of Kyrgyz were collective farmers. After 1974, the *propiska* system was introduced throughout the USSR that involved getting the Ministry of the Interior permission to live in large cities – a formidable hurdle for Kyrgyz efforts to migrate to the capital.

Moreover, whereas in other countries, a common way for young people from rural areas to settle in cities is to remain there after graduation and find employment. This was not the case in the USSR because graduates were allocated their first jobs through a system of distribution (*razpredeleniia*), and the Kyrgyz were almost always sent to work in rural areas. This produced an unusual situation where nearly 7% of Kyrgyzstan's rural population had higher education, the second-highest (after Georgia) among the 15 republics. Of course, the unrealized hopes of mobility were a source of frustration.

Geographic and occupational mobility was also limited because most enterprises were under All-Union jurisdiction, controlled directly by Moscow; they paid scant attention to the training and recruitment of national cadres. This caused considerable tensions in society.

Recognizing this, the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan, led by Isaak Razzakov, the First Secretary, underappreciated, sought to reform existing practices. In 1958, the Central Committee passed a resolution calling for measures to advance educational and occupational mobility by introducing Kyrgyz as the language of instruction in vocational and post-secondary education, increasing the proportion of Kyrgyz students in technicums and institutions of higher education. Razzakov was removed from office in 1961 charged with “errors in nationalities policy”.

The post-War period saw a large migration of Russians and others from the USSR's European parts. Between 1940 and 1979, the Republic's Russian population tripled. The Kyrgyz

became a minority in their Republic: 40% of the population in 1959 and increased their share to 48% by 1979 because of high birth rates. The Kyrgyz formed 22% of the urban population in 1979 and a mere 17% of Bishkek's population.

Bishkek had one school with Kyrgyz as the language of instruction. Kyrgyz was not taught in the Russian medium schools. This meant that the Kyrgyz who lived in Bishkek did not study their native language, and this had serious consequences for the formation of Kyrgyz elites – an issue that perhaps can be taken up in the discussion.

The occupational marginalization of Kyrgyz was quite astounding. Looking at the social structure of the Kyrgyz in 1959, only 4% of Kyrgyz were workers, 8% employees in various organizations, 88% collective or state farmers. By the end of the 1980s, the Kyrgyz made up only 6.3% of employees in the electro energy sector- a leading sector of the economy, 19% of those working in the automobile and transport sectors, etc. It was only in light industry did their numbers rise to one third largely because many enterprises of this sector were in small towns, close to the countryside.

Regarding education, the Kyrgyz had made remarkable progress in obtaining complete secondary education: 272 per 1,000 population according to the 1979 all-Union census; this was higher than the numbers for the Russian population of the USSR, to use as a basis for comparison - 194 per 1,000. In the case of Kyrgyz women, the number was 246 per 1,000 as compared to their Russian counterparts – 184. These numbers are important because obtaining complete secondary education made you eligible for admission to higher education. But the Kyrgyz rate of higher education, 46 per 1,000 population, was much lower than that of Russians – 76 per 1,000 population. Why didn't a larger number of Kyrgyz secondary school graduates proceed to gain higher education?

There are several reasons. The first is that admission to higher educational institutions in the Soviet Union was a highly competitive process. Holding a good high school diploma was not enough – you had to pass university entrance examinations, one of the most stressful moments in the lives of young people and their parents. Getting into a Soviet university was a far more competitive business than in the West. And of course, children of urban educated classes with their connections had considerable advantages over someone arriving from the countryside.

However, educational mobility was further constrained because instruction in post-secondary institutions (with few exceptions) was in Russian, placing graduates of Kyrgyz language schools at a disadvantage in admissions. In 1979, only 33% of Kyrgyz had Russian language fluency. In 1966, the Kyrgyz formed 39% of higher education students and were overwhelmingly concentrated in pedagogical and agricultural institutes whose graduates would be sent to the villages. In the Polytechnical Institute, on the other hand, their numbers were negligible. The Kyrgyz accounted for 28% of enrolment in technicums.

It is not surprising that tensions in society arose from the rising expectations that accompanied high completion rates of secondary education whose graduates failed to gain university admission. These strains would burst to the fore when Kyrgyzstan gained independence in 1991.

An economic-instrumentalist paradigm drove higher education in the Soviet period. The development of a comprehensive university system was never a priority, and Kyrgyzstan, like nine other republics of the USSR, had one university. Higher education was dominated by eight 'Institutes', providing a narrower specialization related to engineering, medicine, agriculture, and pedagogy. Universities and institutes were not centres of research – the connection between research and teaching was always weak. Research was the purview of the Academy of Sciences and scores of specialized research institutions supported by various ministries.

Overall, the total number of students in higher education was small – 55,000 in 1980. In this instrumentalist system, technicums played a significant role in offering specialized secondary education. Technicums enrolled almost as many students as the system of higher education - 50,000 students. In both types of institutions, the number of students recruited was determined by planning authorities who estimated labour requirements. There were limits on enrolment. Graduates were allocated their first jobs through the distribution system mentioned earlier. Thus, there was no graduate unemployment - although many graduates were less than thrilled with the job they were given.

In 1991 the Soviet construct imploded. In Kyrgyzstan, the institutional arrangements that sustained national-cultural stratification were removed. And the higher education system had to abruptly face the reality that the economy that shaped it no longer existed.

## II)

The USSR was dissolved in 1991. The republics' national movements wanted independence; however, they did not bargain on the economic shock therapy that followed. The structures of the planned economy were dismantled, but none of the stakeholders had any real understanding how a market economy should function. The newly independent Kyrgyz government had minimal capacity to deal with the complex issues and outsourced much policy thinking to new players on the scene – international financial institutions, international donors, advisors and consultants.

Education was not given much consideration since the country had relatively high primary, secondary, and tertiary enrolment rates, and it was thought that this stock of human capital was enough to drive growth if market reforms were implemented.

The reforms dismantled collective farms and distributed land, creating thousands of small (uneconomic) peasant households. Small and medium enterprises were privatized along with most large enterprises—a process accompanied by a good deal of corruption, little industrial

restructuring and widespread factory closures. Manufacturing and agriculture—once the largest GDP component —by 2018 represented only 15% and 11% of GDP, respectively; services accounted for 50% of GDP; and mining 12% (read Kumtor) more than agriculture.

The economy went into a downward spiral, and the 1990 GDP level was recovered only by 2018. The major source of economic recovery was the re-export of goods brought from neighbouring China to Russia, Kazakhstan and other countries. Hundreds of thousands of people made a living by becoming astute traders—a new entrepreneurial activity in society. The other major factor in the country’s economic recovery was labour migration to Russia and Kazakhstan, with remittances equivalent to 38% of GDP, which was more than the domestic manufacturing and agricultural sectors combined.

Today, there is relatively little formal employment: only 13% of the total working population have formal, contractual employment in the private sector; 17% in the public sphere. The remaining 70% work informally based on a ‘patent’.

In the meantime, the ethno-demographic picture had changed dramatically. The Russian population decreased, resulting in a loss of a large number of technical and scientific personnel. The Kyrgyz now represented 73% of the total population, 62% of the urban population and 66% of Bishkek’s. Kyrgyz students who were 41% of the university population in 1991 – by 2017, 80%. Women are 53% of the total enrolment.

### III)

Given these dramatic changes in employment, what should have been the response of higher educational institutions? And who could have spearheaded re-thinking? There wasn’t much national reflection, and donors did not help. For the longest time, donors concentrated their assistance on achieving Millennium Goals – increasing the primary school enrolment rate that Kyrgyzstan achieved decades before – and ignored higher education.

Meanwhile, higher education developed in a parallel universe. While playing an important role in meeting youth’s social aspirations and keeping them engaged during vulnerable years, the connections between higher education and labour market demand have been weak. It plays a limited role in knowledge production and societal engagement.

Post Independence, higher education policy and reform were a low priority for the Government. The government’s major decision was to liberalize procedures for establishing universities: institutes were converted into universities, and many technicums also achieved university status. The government allowed private institutions to be established by domestic entrepreneurs as well as foreign universities. Whereas in the Soviet period, students paid no tuition and received a stipend, now the government allowed the almost limitless recruitment of fee-paying students. Quality, relevance and innovation were not high on the agenda.

Universities responded to pent-up societal demand for higher education by expanding their enrolments, regardless of graduate outcomes or labour market demand. Getting a university diploma, so difficult to obtain in the past, was a matter of social prestige. It was also a pre-requisite for a government job. The expansion was spurred by heads of state institutions who needed revenues to survive and by entrepreneurs who viewed universities as a new business opportunity. The expansion also occurred because of the demographic 'youth bulge', and the remarkable growth of secondary education enrolments: in 2015, the overall the net secondary enrolment rate was over 80% - and that was the case for women as well.

By 2018, Kyrgyzstan had 51 universities, of which 35 were state-run, and 16 are private. This is an enormous number for a small country of 6 million people. State-run universities account for the majority of total enrollment - 86% of total enrollment. Universities are concentrated in Bishkek - 66% of the total, 12% in Osh, 21% in the rest of the country. However, while enrollments increased from 58,000 in 1991 to 250,000 by 2007, they declined by one third by 2017, which is interesting.

Several factors account for the recent decline in student numbers. Migration is a significant factor since most of those who leave have completed secondary education see no point in going to university to join the army of unemployed graduates. Demographically, the youth bulge is slowly shrinking.

Moreover, many secondary school graduates now choose technicums (renamed colleges) offering two-three year specialized professional education whose enrolments grew from 27,000 in 2003 to 92,000 in 2017 with women representing 56% of the total. Some have simply lost interest in higher education because of low returns on higher education investment, given the labour market conditions. The 2017 household survey found that the monthly salary of households headed by someone with higher education is only 4.5% more than if the head has specialized secondary education and 4.1% more if the person has only primary vocational training.

Looking at the annual output of graduates by fields of study, one would think that higher education exists in a sphere unto itself. A country of six million people does not need over 5,600 law graduates – 2018 data. Some 13,000 students (27% all graduates), complete economics and management programmes when there are hardly any enterprises to manage. The country does not need 9,000 graduates in the education/pedagogy, of whom around 5% end up in a schoolroom. There are only about 2,500 science graduates (all fields), and in a country where agriculture is the largest employer, universities graduate just 300 students in agriculture and veterinary sciences per annum. And there are virtually no graduates specializing in logistics, services or tourism.

Universities continue to produce graduates in mismatched fields, and those in relevant fields are so poorly trained that they are unemployable without significant retraining. For example, although thousands complete technology programmes, primarily IT, as one of the industry

leaders noted at a recent conference, "We are not getting graduates capable of working in our company. We have to train them for 3-6 months before they can start any work. Their degrees are useless for us." Small and medium business employers find that the university curriculum is seriously disconnected from labour market requirements, and they have to spend much effort to equip employees with the necessary skills and knowledge.

The agenda for the reform of higher education in Kyrgyzstan is enormous. The qualifications of faculty are an indication of the depth of the problem. In 2017, 66% of university faculty did not have a post-graduate degree, 28% had a candidate of sciences credential, and 6% had a doctorate. One of the consequences of this is that universities do not have the capacity to produce research.

The fastest growth of universities occurred between 1991 and 1998 when the economy was in deep crisis, and the resources allocated for libraries, equipment and faculty salaries were scant. In 2018, government expenditure on education (overall) was 5.5% of GDP; 18% of the state budget is allocated to education. These proportions are high by international comparison; however, given Kyrgyzstan's small GDP, the per capita expenditure on schools is just \$377, and per university student, \$382.

Higher education stays afloat because the government has permitted state institutions to charge fees: only 16% of students do not pay tuition; 84% are fee-paying students. Since universities were given autonomy, data on revenues from fees and other sources is almost impossible to obtain. Running a state university can be a pretty good business providing high enrolments is maintained, irrespective of the field of study; the bottom line is better if costly disciplines requiring equipment are not taught, and entrance requirements can also be relaxed to fill classroom space.

Corruption is rife: a recent survey found that, 82% of students reported that corruption in higher education is widespread. A recent public opinion poll revealed that only 2% of the population thought universities were not corrupt.

Universities have the basic social responsibility of providing the human capital required to progress society and the economy, but they are also a place that should nurture informed and compassionate citizens. All too many are doing neither and are instead breeding grounds of cynicism. It is a sad commentary that a recent survey found that the majority of students stated that "the goal of education is to obtain a diploma, not to receive knowledge, skills or know-how". It is hardly a consolation that the 'diploma disease' is common across Central Asia.

#### IV)

Government reforms by half-measures have stalled innovation. Among these are giving universities autonomy and the establishment of Boards of Trustees. With the government spending only \$382 per student, universities would collapse without income from fees.

However, the state taxes tuition income. At the same time it has done virtually nothing to foster an enabling environment for philanthropic giving, and universities remain in difficult financial situations. While the Ministry of Education has minimized its role in dictating the curriculum, it moved this responsibility to selected universities, and innovation continues to be stifled.

To be fair, there are many examples of innovation. The launch of the German-Kyrgyz Institute of Applied Informatics with strong links to the IT business is one of them. Another is the University of Central Asia's School of Professional and Continuing Education – SPCE - offering low-cost quality short-cycle programmes focused on skills development is another example that has engaged 30,000 learners (61% female). It operates in Naryn, one of the poorest regions of the country. An external evaluation found that 75% report to have found new or better jobs, and 12% started or expanded a business because of the courses; 88% said SPCE helped them stay in the community.

Skills, not diplomas, are what the country needs. This kind of tertiary short-cycle education is the fastest growing sector of education in Europe. In Kyrgyzstan almost, no universities have departments of continuing education.

And they are needed: nearly 30% of youth (15-25) in Kyrgyzstan are in the NEET group – not in education, employment or training. We know the social consequences of having a vast number of marginalized young people. In this regard, it should be emphasized since independence there has been no meaningful regional economic development programme advanced. The world passed the urbanization tipping point quite a number of years ago: today 55% of the global population are town dwellers. Kyrgyzstan's urbanization rate today is 36%, and in 1970, that is 50 years ago, it was 37%. In some oblasts the rate of urbanization today is lower than it was in 1959. This is bound up with the collapse of economic activity of secondary towns that could be such an important provider of jobs for rural youth and stimulus to acquire skills.

What needs to be reform in higher education is well known ... curriculum reform, establishing centres of excellence, real university autonomy, etc. However, these reforms are complex and politically difficult to accomplish. They can only be done if the leading sectors of society - those who hold political and economic power – support it. This effort has to be underpinned by research to ensure decision-making is evidence-based. There are many international experiences to be tapped. There is so much at stake. University reform is about building the intelligence of society that gives it the capacity to understand highly complex issues. And nothing is more important than that.

But there are preconditions for such complex undertakings to succeed. Regional clan politics and rent-seeking groups are the banes of the Kyrgyz polity. The Kyrgyz have to emerge as a political nation, one where leading sectors of society have a national vision; and a political culture with a broad consensus on values and priorities, on what can and cannot be done.

A political national cannot exist with a capital – that concentrates the nation's talents and ambitions, and where various groups arriving over the years are meshed and thinking on a national scale occurs and a national vision emerges. That is beginning to happen on a much larger scale. And this is a hopeful sign.

(I want to conclude with acknowledgements. This talk is based on a chapter of a UNESCO book to be published by Brill shortly. The co-authors of that chapter are Zalina Enikeeva from UCA's Institute of Public Policy and Administration and Tamara Krawchenko, University of Victoria.)