Natural shocks and migration: the case of Kyrgyzstan

Eugenia Chernina, Junior research fellow Centre for Labour Market Studies at Higher School of Economics, Moscow

Life in Kyrgyzstan Conference, Bishkek October 2017

Motivation

- Considerable part of international migration observed between Russia and other CIS countries is temporary and circular
- It is important to understand how sensitive are migrant streams to various shocks and understand migration decision
- Natural shocks represent an important source of exogenous variation to households' incentives that may vary migration behavior
- Natural shocks are becoming more common due to climate change

Motivation - 2

 Households in developing countries experience multiple shocks and develop various coping strategies

[Fafchamps, Udry, Czukas 1998; Kazianga, Udry 2004; Fafchamps, Lund 2003]

 Migration is mostly viewed as an ex-ante coping strategy, while it seems to be understudied as an ex-post coping strategy

[Stark, Bloom 1985; Yang, Choi 2007; Yang 2008]

- As a coping strategy, migration is quite costly and is not always feasible
- Households develop "safety nets" to help each other to overcome shocks consequences. Can migration financing be used as a mean of such help?

How natural shocks affect migration

- Natural shocks indefinitely affect household migration decision
- Most of the times effect is positive:

Evidence for internal migration: Gray, Mueller 2012a; Badiani, Safir 2010; Beine, Parsons 2015

Evidence for international migration: Kugler, Yuksel 2008; Hanson, McIntosh 2010

• But sometimes effect may be negative:

Evidence for internal migration: Gray, Mueller 2012b; Tse 2011

Evidence for international migration: Halliday 2006, 2008, 2012; Yang 2008

Mechanisms behind the effects

Positive effect:

- Need for funds to restore damaged assets
- Deteriorating productivity in home production as a result of destroyed capital or inefficient technology
- Falling wages or increased unemployment at local labour market

Negative effect:

- Budget constraint makes migration a non-feasible strategy:
 - destroyed assets or lost income may not allow to finance costs of migration
 - aggregate shock may disrupt mechanisms of communal mutual support [Yang 2008]
- Preference to retain labor at home
 - Rising relative productivity in home production [Halliday 2010]
 - Need for extra labor investment in subsistence farming [Halliday 2012]

Questions

- What is the effect of natural shocks on migration decision?
- What is a mechanism behind the observed effect?
- Does migration financing is used as a way to support affected households?

The context of Kyrgyzstan

- Mainly a mountainous Central Asian country with significant variation of natural and sociodemographic conditions between the regions
- Territory is subject to various natural disasters (earthquakes, landslides) and significant interannual temperature variation
- 30% of labour force employed in agriculture
- 37-41% rural poverty rate
- 90% of agricultural lands in private ownership
- Migrant remittances in 2013 31% GDP

Data

- "Life in Kyrgyzstan" panel survey data on 3000 households over years 2010 to 2013
- Representative nationally and at the regional level (East, West, North, South)
- We use subsample of rural households: 1500-1700 households yearly

Natural shocks

"During the last 12 months, has your household been affected by the following shocks?"

	2010	2011	2012	2013	No migrants	With migrants
Drought	4.52%	40.77%	33.99%	15.44%	23.54%	24.00%
Too much rain or flood	19.73%	21.89%	15.80%	16.01%	17.85%	21.29%
Very cold winter	22.47%	22.06%	56.91%	27.66%	32.33%	31.43%
Earthquake	6.92%	43.95%	2.93%	11.59%	16.02%	18.30%
Landslides	9.78%	8.14%	8.56%	4.41%	7.38%	9.87%

Migration participation

year	2010	2011	2012	2013
Household has international	4.2. 22/	4.4.00/		
migrants	13.8%	14.2%	18.1%	20.1%
Household has international				
migrants financed from own funds	6.7%	9.1%	11.6%	13.5%
Household has international migrants financed with the help				
from friends or relatives	6.9%	5.7%	8.2%	7.1%
Household has international migrants financed by other				
method	0.9%	0.9%	0.4%	1.0%

Over 90% of migrant families have 1 or 2 migrants

Migrant vs non-migrant households

- Migrant households are larger, with higher share of working age members, more of them are Kyrgyz and Uzbek and less other ethnicities
- Migrant households more frequently own land and livestock and cultivate land but own and cultivate smaller parcels; they also have lower share of income from home production and local labour market
- Migrant households live in larger settlements in the South

Empirical strategy

 $y_{it}^* = \beta X_{it-1} + \gamma_k shock_{itk} + D_t + \varepsilon_{it} + u_i$, i=1...K, t=1...T

where y_{it}^* – utility from household participation in migration

shock_{itk} – natural shock experienced by household, k=1..K;

X_{it-1} – household pre-shock characteristics;

 D_t – period dummy, t = 1...T;

u_i – individual effect;

 ϵ_{it} – random error such that $E[\epsilon_{it} | u_i, x_{1i}, ..., x_{1T}] = 0$, $\epsilon_{it} \sim$ Type I extreme value distributions

List of controlled household characteristics

- Socio-demographic
 - HH size, hh age and sex composition, head age, head education, head ethnicity
- Wealth & economic activities
 - Asset index, owned land, cultivated land, livestock ownership (selfestimated value), share of income from home production, from local labour market activities and from private transfers
- Time&place characteristics
 - Month and year of interview, region (oblast), community population size

Shocks effects on migration participation

Shock	International migration participation				
	RE	RE	FE		
drought	-0.36***	-0.34**	-0.33**		
too much rain or flood	-0.32*	-0.23	-0.35		
very cold winter	-0.09	-0.14	-0.03		
earthquake	-0.08	-0.03	0.17		
landslides	-0.17	-0.18	-0.41		
Assets&economic activities	NO	YES	YES		
Demographic controls	YES	YES	YES		
Date®ion controls	YES	YES	YES		
N of obs	4,823	4,689	1,115		
N hhid	1,717	1,692	383		

Mechanisms: hypotheses

Positive effect

Mechanism: Deteriorating productivity in home production as a result of destroyed capital or inefficient technology

Test: The higher is **engagement in home production** the more migration increases (or less decreases) in response to shock

Mechanism: Falling wages or increased unemployment at local labour market **Test:** The higher is **engagement in local labour market** the more migration increases (or less decreases) in response to shock

Negative effect

Mechanism: Destroyed assets or lost income may not allow to finance costs of migration **Test:** - The lower is household **wealth** the more migration decreases (or less increases) in response to shock

- Negative effect goes through **self-funding**

Mechanism: Aggregate shock may disrupt mechanisms of communal mutual support **Test:** The lower is household **wealth** the more migration decreases (or less increases) in response to shock

- Negative effect goes through help-funding

- The higher **is shock-prevalence rate** in the community the more migration decreases (or less increases) in response to shock

Mechanism: Preference to retain labor at home for home production purposes

Test: - The higher is **engagement in home production** the less migration increases (or more decreases) in response to shock

Testing mechanisms

 $y_{it}^* = \beta X_{it-1} + \gamma_k shock_{itk} + \delta shock_{itk} * X_{it-1} + D_t + \varepsilon_{it} + u_i$, i=1...K, t=1...T

- δ sign and significance is a matter of interest for:
 - Wealth (asset index, land ownership)
 - Engagement in agriculture and other home production (cultivated land, livestock ownership, share of income from home production)
 - Engagement in labour market (share of income from payed work)
 - Share of hh in community experiencing shock
- Look at shocks' effects on migration participation by source of funding

Shocks effects on migration participation by source of funding

International migration		International migration – self-funding			International migration – funding using help			
RE	RE	FE	RE	RE	FE	RE	RE	FE
-0.36***	-0.34**	-0.33**	-0.41***	-0.40***	-0.47**	0.01	0.05	0.17
-0.32*	-0.23	-0.35	-0.47**	-0.40**	-0.35	0.01	0.14	-0.18
-0.09	-0.14	-0.03	-0.11	-0.16	-0.28	-0.01	-0.07	0.10
-0.08	-0.03	0.17	0.30	0.30	0.58**	-0.61***	-0.59***	-0.54*
-0.17	-0.18	-0.41	-0.14	-0.15	-0.37	-0.13	-0.11	-0.46
NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
4,823	4,689	1,115	4,823	4,689	960	4,823	4,689	727
1,717	1,692	383	1,717	1,692	333	1,717	1,692	250
	RE -0.36*** -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.17 NO YES 4,823	RE RE -0.36*** -0.34** -0.32* -0.23 -0.09 -0.14 -0.08 -0.03 -0.17 -0.18 NO YES YES YES YES YES 4,823 4,689	RE RE FE -0.36*** -0.34** -0.33** -0.32* -0.23 -0.35* -0.09 -0.14 -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 0.17* -0.17 -0.18 0.17* NO YES YES YES YES YES 4,823 4,689 1,115*	International migrationSetREREFERE-0.36***-0.34**-0.33**-0.41***-0.32**-0.23-0.35*-0.47***-0.09-0.14-0.03-0.11**-0.08-0.030.17*0.30**-0.17-0.18*10.41**-0.14**NOYESYESYESYESYESYESYES4,8234,6891,1154,823	International migration self-funding RE RE RE RE -0.36*** -0.34** -0.33** -0.41*** -0.40*** -0.32* -0.23 -0.35 -0.47** -0.40*** -0.09 -0.14 -0.03 -0.17 -0.40** -0.017 -0.18 0.17 0.30 0.30 -0.17 -0.18 -0.41 -0.14 -0.15 NO YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 4,823 4,689 1,115 4,823 4,689	International migration Self-funding RE RE FE RE RE FE -0.36^{***} -0.34^{**} -0.33^{**} -0.41^{***} -0.40^{***} -0.47^{***} -0.32^{**} -0.23 -0.35 -0.41^{***} -0.40^{***} -0.47^{***} -0.32^{**} -0.23 -0.35 -0.41^{***} -0.40^{***} -0.47^{***} -0.32^{**} -0.23 -0.35 -0.41^{***} -0.40^{***} -0.47^{***} -0.32^{**} -0.23 -0.35 -0.47^{***} -0.40^{***} -0.47^{***} -0.32^{**} -0.23 -0.35 -0.47^{**} -0.40^{***} -0.40^{***} -0.039 -0.14 -0.03 -0.11^{**} -0.28^{**} -0.28^{**} -0.17^{**} -0.18^{**} -0.41^{**} -0.15^{**} -0.35^{**} NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES <td>International migration Self-funding funding RE <</td> <td>International migration Self-funding funding using here RE 0.3343 0.4133 0.4133 0.4134 0.023 0.023 0.011 0.0234 0.0234</td>	International migration Self-funding funding RE <	International migration Self-funding funding using here RE RE 0.3343 0.4133 0.4133 0.4134 0.023 0.023 0.011 0.0234

Hypotheses testing: Drought

			Self-	Self-	Help-
	Total	Total	financed	financed	financed
VARIABLES	migration	migration	migration	migration	migration
drought	-0.65***	-2.39***	-0.68***	-2.29***	0.13
drought*asset index					0.15**
drought*size of cultivated land	0.08**		0.08*		
drought*size of owned land		0.24***		0.23***	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	`YES
Observations	4,689	4,689	4,600	4,600	4,600
Number of hhid	1,692	1,692	1,688	1,688	1,688

Positive effect

Mechanism: Deteriorating productivity in home production as a result of destroyed capital or inefficient technology

Test: - More migration with higher engagement in home production

More total and self-funded migration with more cultivated land

Negative effect

Mechanism: Destroyed assets or lost income may not allow to finance costs of migration

Test: - Less migration the poorer is household

Less total and self-funded migration with less land owned

- Self-funding goes down

Hypotheses testing: Rain/flood

	Total migration
too much rain or flood	-0.14
too much rain or flood*asset index	0.15**
Controls	YES
Observations	4,689
Number of hhid	1,692

Negative effect

Mechanism: Destroyed assets or lost income may not allow to finance costs of migration

Test: - Less migration the **poorer** is household

Less total migration with lower asset index

- Self-funding goes down

Hypotheses testing: Cold winter

	Total migration	Total migration
very cold winter	-0.09	-0.61**
very cold winter*asset_ind	0.12**	
very cold winter* livestock		0.04*
Controls	YES	YES
Observations	4,689	4,689
Number of hhid	1,692	1,692

Positive effect

Mechanism: Deteriorating productivity in home production as a result of destroyed capital or inefficient technology

Test: - More migration with higher engagement in home production

More total migration with higher livestock ownership

Negative effect

Mechanism: Destroyed assets or lost income may not allow to finance costs of migration

Test: - Less migration the **poorer** is household

Less total migration with lower asset index

Hypotheses testing: Earthquake

	Help-	Self-	Self-	Help-
	financed	financed	financed	financed
	migration	migration	migration	migration
earthquake	-0.59***	0.10	-1.70*	0.31
earthquake*share of wages income		0.85*		
earthquake* size of owned land			0.23**	
(earthquake = 0)* share of affected households				0.95
(earthquake = 1)* share of affected households				-0.99*
Controls		YES	YES	YES
Observations		4,600	4,600	4,600
Number of hhid		1,688	1,688	1,688

Positive effect

Mechanism: Falling wages or increased unemployment at local labour market **Test:** More migration with higher **engagement in local labour market**

More self-funded migration with higher share of labour market income

Negative effect

Mechanism: Destroyed assets or lost income may not allow to finance costs of migration **Test:** - Less migration the **poorer** is household

Less self-funded migration with less land-ownership

Mechanism: Aggregate shock may disrupt mechanisms of communal mutual support

Test: - Help-funding goes down

- Less migration the higher is shock-prevalence rate in the community

Less help-funded migration with the higher shock-prevalence rate in the community

Hypotheses testing: Landslides

	Total migration	Total migration	Help-financed migration
landslides	-1.02*	0.62	0.63
landslides*livestock ownership	0.07*		
(landslides=0)*share effected households		0.12	0.66
(landslides=1)*share effected households		-1.49**	-1.34*
Observations	4,689	4,689	4,600
Number of hhid	1,692	1,692	1,688

Positive effect

Mechanism: Deteriorating productivity in home production as a result of destroyed capital or inefficient technology

Test: - More migration with higher engagement in home production

More migration for higher livestock ownership

Negative effect

Mechanism: Aggregate shock may disrupt mechanisms of communal mutual support

Test: - Less migration the higher **is shock-prevalence rate** in the community

Less total and help-funded migration with higher shock-prevalence rate in the community

Summary of results

- On average, natural shocks have little impact on migration behavior of Kyrgyz households: the only strong significant effect is for droughts
- For most of the shocks oppositely directed mechanisms neutralize each other
- All natural shocks (except landslides) vary with households' wealth such that poor households have less migration a sign of possible liquidity constraint

Still need a better control for welfare (consumption)

- We see practically no considerable rise in friends and relatives help for migration funding as a response to shocks
- On the contrary, for earthquakes and landslides there is evidence for creating credit constraint through undermining the mechanism of communal mutual support